## These Artifacts aren't Fiction



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## Introducing: Matt Scheurer

I work for a big well-known organization...



As Vice President (VP) of Computer Security and Incident Response (IR). However, I have many years of hands-on technical experience, including Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR).

I am also a Podcast Host for



https://threatreel.com

**Connect / Contact / Follow Matt:** 



https://www.linkedin.com/in/mattscheurer



https://x.com/c3rkah

### Where Matt volunteers....

I am an Official



**Advocate** 

https://www.hackingisnotacrime.org



Advisory Board: Information Technology and Cybersecurity <a href="https://www.mywccc.org/">https://www.mywccc.org/</a>



Women's Security Alliance (WomSA) Technical Mentor https://www.womsa.org

## Introducing: Tuan Phan

- Independent Info Security Researcher
- Professional Experience
  - eDiscovery, Forensics
     Investigation, and
     Insider Threat
     Strategy



### **Disclaimer!**

Yes, the presenters both have day jobs. However...

Opinions expressed are based solely on their own independent security research and do not express or reflect the views or opinions of their employers.



## We are not Lawyers!



This presentation is for educational purposes only! Please consult with qualified legal counsel before using these techniques in an actual investigation.

# **Out-of-Scope Topics**

- 3<sup>rd</sup> party "Forensically Sound" tools for
  - Memory Capture (a.k.a. a "Memory Dumps")
  - Disk Imaging Tools
- How-To's
  - Chain of Custody
  - Court Cases and Trials
    - Data handling and acceptable practices
  - Isolation, remote access, and when to disconnect or shutdown
- Data storage, data archival, data write blockers, etc.

## Data Preservation Methodology

- Collect a "Forensic Image" first and foremost!
  - Work from a "Forensic Clone"
    - A working copy from your original "Forensic Image"
  - After completing & hashing a "Forensic Image"
    - Creating a "Forensic Clone", while the "Forensic Image" is copying, provides a good opportunity to conduct live host eDiscovery acquisition
- Minimize activities that could modify system data and access times as much as possible!

## The Windows SRUM Database

SRUM (SRUDB.dat) The System Resource Utilization Monitor (**SRUM**) is built into Windows 8 and above. System "App History" data is recorded and stored in an Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) database named "**SRUDB.dat**".

### The "SRUDB.dat" File

The Windows SRUM database file is located at:

#### C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat

Think of the SRUM database as holding the same level of details typically found in most commercial Endpoint/Network Detection & Response (**XDR**) solutions, but without any monitoring, alerting, "Detection", or "Response" capabilities.

#### **Useful SRUM Data**

The Windows SRUM was never intended to be used for forensic purposes by Microsoft. Consequently, more details are stored than is typically helpful for our investigations. We'll focus our efforts on the following:

- Application Resources Usage
- Network Usage

## "SRUDB.dat" Tools

Here are some Free and Open-Source Software options:

- SRUM Dump 2
  - https://github.com/MarkBaggett/srum-dump
- Velociraptor
  - https://www.rapid7.com/products/velociraptor
- NirSoft (AppResourcesUsageView & NetworkUsageView)
  - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/app\_resources\_usage\_view.html
  - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/network\_usage\_view.html


# **SRUDB.dat Example Output**

AppResourc	esUsageView				-	ō X
	w Options Help					
	r 🔎 📲					
Record ID	Timestamp	App Name	App Description	App ID	User SID /	Foregrou
<b>1001</b>	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>877</b>	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\cmd.exe		722	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1132</b>	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1009</b>	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1256</b>	2/11/2023 2:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1445</b>	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1379</b>	2/11/2023 3:24:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1566</b>	2/11/2023 4:26:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1129</b>	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1123</b>	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\explorer.exe		404	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■880	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1442</b>	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1114</b>	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>998</b>	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1377</b>	2/11/2023 3:24:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1366</b>	2/11/2023 3:24:00 PM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1253</b>	2/11/2023 2:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1005</b>	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:		1044	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1428</b>	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■862	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1444</b>	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Users\User\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe		963	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■876	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Users\User\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe		963	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	

## **Application Resources Usage**

May include the following application execution details:

Timestamp, Application Name, User SID, cycle times, bytes read and written, number of read and write operations, and more.



## Network Resource Usage

May include: the timestamp, name and description of the service or application, the name and SID of the user, the network adapter, and the total number of bytes sent and received by the specified service or application.

Properties	×
Record ID:	23
Timestamp:	1/12/2023 10:00:00 PM
App Name:	s (x86)\microsoft\edge\application\msedge.exe
App Description:	
App ID:	351
User Name:	
User SID:	S-1-5-21-124793260-1819790467-2837426190-5
Network Adapter:	
Bytes Sent:	2,681
Bytes Received:	12,811
Network Adapter Guid:	
Network Adapter Luid:	0×6008001000000
Connection Name:	
	OK

### **SRUM Database Conclusions**

The Windows SRUM database helps us with identifying file execution, user attribution, activity correlation, and time lining of system events.



#### Web Browser Artifacts

- →What they are
  - →Where they are
    - **→Why these are important** 
      - →How they are parsed



### What & Where

- These artifacts are the data left behind by a web browser, when visiting a website
- Computers store a variety of detailed information from visited websites
  - Different browsers store their artifacts/files in different locations

# Why these are important

Essential for digital forensic examiners and Incident Response

- These artifacts help to identify
  - The source of malicious attack traffic
  - Proxy policy violation





## Investigation Tooling


#### **Data Extraction & Analysis Tools**

- Free and Open-Source Software
  - Browser History Examiner (BHE) Foxtron
  - BrowsingHistoryView Nirsoft
  - BrowserDownloadView- Nirsoft
  - DB Browser for SQLite
  - Hindsight
- Various 3<sup>rd</sup> party commercial forensic tools



#### **Artifact Sources**

- Suspect Hard Drives
- Forensic Clones
  - Hard Drive Images
- Memory Dumps
- Databases and Other Files (User Profile)



• Homegroup



## High-Value Artifacts

#### **Most Notably...**

- History/URLs
  - Typed URLs
  - Searches
- Cache
- Logins
- Cookies

- Form values
  - Auto-fill

- Downloads
- Favorites
  - a.k.a. Bookmarks

## **Private Browsing**



Private (a.k.a. incognito) browsing modes allow users to surf the web without retaining browser history, cache, cookie files, and more.



## **Memory Dumps**


"Memory Dumps" are a snapshot of memory captured for memory analysis

 When a RAM dump is captured, it contains data relating to all running processes and other web browser artifacts at the time of the memory capture



# History/URLs

This artifact reveals navigation history of the user, which may be used to identify if a user visited malicious websites.



## **Example History Artifact Paths**

#### **Microsoft Edge**

- •\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default
- •\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Cache

#### **Mozilla Firefox**

- •\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<profile folder>
- •\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<profile folder>\cache2


#### **Google Chrome**

- •\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default
- •\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache

# History Parsed Example 1/4

Advanced Options								
From: 24/11/12 10:14:32	ry items from the following to							
Load only URLs contain one of the specified strings (comma-delimited list):								
☐ Don't load URLs that contain one of the specified strings (comma-delimited list):								
Web Browsers								
☐ Internet Explorer	✓ Chrome	Firefox						
☐ Internet Explorer 10/11 + Edge	Chrome Canary	☐ SeaMonkey						
☐ Safari	Opera	☐ Yandex						
Edge (Chromium-based)	Pale Moon	☐ Vivaldi						
☐ Waterfox								

# History Parsed Example 2/4




# History Parsed Example 3/4

Browsing H	istory It	ems								
А		В	С	D	E	F	G	Н	1	J
Browsing	g His	tory Items	3							
Created by u	using E	rowsingHisto	oryView							
URL	B	Title	Visit Time	Visit Count	Visited From	Visit Type	Web Browser	User Profile	Browser Profile	URL Length
http://window	s.micro	soft.com/en-U	3/22/2015 8:09:2	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	74
https://dl.goo	gle.con	/update2/1.3.	3/22/2015 8:11:0	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	284
http://go.micr	rosoft.co	om/fwlink/?Linl	3/22/2015 8:09:0	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	44
http://go.micr	rosoft.co	om/fwlink/?Linl	3/22/2015 8:09:2	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	45
https://www.g	google.d	com/webhp?so	3/22/2015 8:55:4	1	https://www.goog	Link	Chrome	admin11	Default	84
http://iweb.dl	source	forge.net/proje	3/25/2015 7:47:3	1			Internet Explorer	informant		84
https://www.g	1000 se	curity checkpo	3/24/2015 2:06:5	1		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	50
http://www.bi	ng.c Bir	ng	3/24/2015 2:05:4	1		Reload	Chrome	informant	Default	20
https://news.	good Go	ogle News	3/24/2015 12:01:	1		Reload	Chrome	informant	Default	46
httn://www.hi	na c Bir	na	3/24/2015 12:01	1		Relnad	Chrome	informant	Default	20

Exported to Excel for detailed inspection and analysis.

# History Parsed Example 4/4



Parsed with a GUI SQLite database browser


# Typed Addresses/URLs

This artifact contains any URL that is typed into the browser address bar.


Also found within the Windows registry (NTUSER.DAT)

Software\Microsoft\InternetExplorer\TypedURLs

# Typed URLs Parsed Example



Artifact from Registry:




#### **Browser Cache**

Contains cache data from various websites such as: image files, JavaScript files, etc.

- Example artifact paths
  - Chrome & EDGE Cache is stored using an Index file ('index'), a number of Data Block files ('data\_#'), and a number of separate data files ('f ######')
  - Firefox Cache is stored using a Cache Map File
     ('\_CACHE\_MAP\_'), three Cache Block files
     ('\_CACHE\_00#\_'), and a number of separate data files. The cache structure was changed in Firefox version 32 and named 'Cache v2'

## Cache Parsed




## Downloads

Provides the file system location where a user's file downloads were saved

- Example artifact paths
  - Chrome & EDGE Downloads are stored in the 'History'
     SQLite database, within the 'downloads' and 'downloads\_url\_chains' tables
  - Firefox Downloads are stored in the 'places.sqlite' database, within the 'moz\_annos' table and associated URL information is stored within the 'moz\_places' table


## Download Parsed Example 1/2

#### SQLite database browser GUI



Download State: The 'value' appears in the 'History' SQLite database  $\rightarrow$  'downloads' table  $\rightarrow$  'state' column.

## Download Parsed Example 2/2



#### **Future Trends**

- I anticipate a growing need in performing forensic analysis within web browsers on mobile devices and in Cloud environments
- As we look toward the future, two trends are likely to emerge
  - Technology & eBusiness will continue to evolve, with data privacy efforts creating new challenges for investigators
  - Increases in cybercrime creating demand for talented forensic practitioners in this career field


### Conclusions

While web browsers play a pivotal role in Internet access, they continue being targeted by threat actors.

Analyzing a web browser's artifacts help the investigator understand the objective, methods, and criminal activities/insider threats.

Examining a suspect's system, the web browser's log details remain a key artifact of most investigations.

## PowerShell Artifacts Collection



PowerShell cmdlets and commands useful for digital forensics, artifact collection, and eDiscovery.

## The Inspiration

Use of "Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts" (LOLBAS) is a notable trend among Offensive Security practitioners and threat actors alike...



## Objectives

- Leverage PowerShell to collect digital forensic artifacts from the endpoint being investigated
- Presentation order based on RFC 3227
  - Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
    - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3227.html
    - Section: 2.1 Order of Volatility

## Reminder: Data Preservation

- Avoid commands that will alter the system, system data, and access times
  - Some Examples (**NOTE**: Not an all-inclusive list)
    - "Clear-", "Debug-", "Disable-", "Enable-", "Expand-", "Import", "Install-", "New-", "Register-", "Remove-", "Save-", "Set-", "Unregister-", "Update-", "Write-", etc.
- Avoid importing or installing external or 3<sup>rd</sup> party modules

# Warning!



Be prepared to defend running PowerShell as "Administrator" if you decide to do so.

 We'll touch on <u>potentially</u> justifiable use-cases momentarily...

## PowerShell Logging

The following syntax timestamps the start and end of our data collection process. All input activity and output results are logged to a file.

```
Start-Transcript -Path "[PATH\FILENAME.EXT]" -NoClobber
```

Stop-Transcript (NOTE: When the investigation is complete)

### **PowerShell Version**

There are a number of automatic variables in PowerShell that store state information. Run the following to display the relevant PowerShell version information:

```
$PSVersionTable
```

(NOTE: Includes "PSEdition" in PowerShell 5.1 and above)

## PowerShell Pro Tip!

PowerShell truncates lengthy text output results by default...

Think of these "Format-List" variations as verbose output options:

Verbose:

Format-List

Very Verbose:

Format-List \*

Very Verbose:

Format-List -Property \*

# **System Time**

Frequently time-stamping command activity during an investigation before and after each step is recommended. Here are some examples...

```
Get-Date
Get-TimeZone
Get-Uptime -Since (NOTE: Requires PowerShell v6.0+)
Get-ComputerInfo -Property "OsLastBootUpTime"
Get-ComputerInfo -Property "OsUptime"
```

## UTC / GMT Time

Investigations are often easier when correlating timestamps using a neutral timezone of reference. The following variable outputs the time in UTC:

```
$Time = Get-Date
$Time.ToUniversalTime()
```

# Hashing Files

Get-FileHash [FILENAME.EXT] -Algorithm [VALUE]

- Value options
  - SHA1
  - SHA256
  - SHA384
  - SHA512
  - MD5

#### Volatile Network Artifacts

The following PowerShell cmdlets are useful for collecting the routing table, ARP, network traffic details, and DNS cache respectively:

**Get-NetRoute** 

Get-NetNeighbor

**Get-NetTCPConnection** 

**Get-NetUDPEndpoint** 

Get-DnsClientCache

#### **Processes and Services**

The following cmdlets are useful for obtaining a list of running processes and services on the endpoint being investigated:

Get-Process

Get-Service

## **Less Volatile Network Artifacts**

The following PowerShell cmdlets are useful for collecting the system network configuration settings and network adapter properties:

**Get-DnsClient** 

Get-DnsClientServerAddress

**Get-NetIPAddress** 

**Get-NetIPConfiguration** 

**Get-NetAdapter** 

## Users and Groups

Unfortunately, PowerShell does <u>not</u> offer a "Get-LoggedOnUsers" cmdlet or similar. The following will obtain host user and group details:

```
Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser | Select Antecedent -Unique
Query User (NOTE: Not an actual cmdlet, but better!)

Get-LocalGroup | Select *
Get-LocalUser | Select *
Get-ChildItem C:\Users
```

## **Execution Policy Settings**

Use the following commands to obtain the current PowerShell execution policy and the execution policy for each scope in order of precedence:

**Get-ExecutionPolicy** 

Get-ExecutionPolicy -List

## Clipboard, Auto-runs, and Tasks

Use the following commands to retrieve text stored in the Windows clipboard, a list of Windows startup items, and Scheduled Tasks:

Get-Clipboard (NOTE: Currently logged in user account)

Get-CimInstance Win32\_StartupCommand

Get-ScheduledTask

### **Host Details**

Use the following to collect additional details such as installed drivers, programs, hotfixes, disk drives, system details, and other OS information:

```
Get-Windows-Driver -Online -All (NOTE: Requires running as 'Administrator')
Get-Package
Get-HotFix
Get-PSDrive
Get-ComputerInfo
```

## The Open Files Conundrum

There are significant challenges in obtaining open file details using native PowerShell...

```
Get-SmbOpenFile
NOTES: Requires running as 'Administrator'. Only works for files
that are remotely accessed
OpenFiles /Query
The system global flag 'maintain objects list' needs to be enabled
to see local opened files.
OpenFiles /Local On (NOTE: Requires running as 'Administrator')
This will take effect after the system is restarted.
```

# More PowerShell Tips & Tricks


These commands and cmdlets barely scratch the surface of PowerShell capabilities in alignment with our objectives of collecting and preservation of data with minimal impacts and changes to the host operating system that we are investigating.

Further reading:

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/

# Questions



## Thank you for attending!

